Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) is a learning model based on the evolution of a population of strategies of an individual agent. In prior work, IEL has been shown to be consistent with the behavior of human subjects in games with a small number of agents. In this paper, we examine the performance of IEL in games with many agents. We find IEL to be robust to this type of scaling. With the appropriate linear adjustment of the mechanism parameter, the convergence behavior of IEL in games induced by Groves-Ledyard mechanisms in quadratic environments is independent of the number of participants.
Introduction
In Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a), we study Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL), a behavioral learning model that is applicable to repeated games with large strategy spaces, including the continuum. In that paper, we used IEL in the games generated by GrovesLedyard mechanisms in a quadratic environment. Standard theories of dynamics, based on best reply dynamics and strategic complementarities, suggest that, for these games, there is a number such that if a parameter of the mechanisms is larger than that number then convergence occurs and if the parameter is smaller then convergence will not occur. Contrary to these standard theories, the prediction from the IEL behavioral model is that the average time to convergence varies smoothly and is U-shaped in the mechanism's free parameter. We validated these predictions with data from economic experiments with human subjects. However, all of the modeling and experiments were done with 5 players.
In this paper we investigate what happens when the number of players increases. One can imagine many possible conjectures about the effect of numbers on the learning behavior of agents operating in a repeated game context. For example, it is possible that with boundedly rational agents who make mistakes, as occurs in IEL, an increase in numbers could lead to more errors and more erratic behavior by compounding the errors. Alternatively, an increase in numbers could, through the law of large numbers, reduce the variability seen by any one agent which would enable them to be closer to fully rational behavior.
In this paper we show that if the increase in agents occurs through replication and if the mechanism parameter is normalized for the population size, then the convergence properties of IEL do not depend on the size of the population. That is, let γ be the mechanism parameter, N be the number of agents, and T γ c be the time of convergence.
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Then T γ c = f (γ/N ) so that if strategies converge to stage game equilibria in 10 rounds when N = 5 and γ = 50, then strategies will converge in 10 rounds when N = 100 and γ = 1000. Interestingly, the size of the economy does not seem to affect the rate of behavioral learning by IEL. We use the notation (N, Z, V ) to denote an environment. One allocation of interest in an environment is the one that maximizes the sum of the utilities subject to feasibility. It is easy to see that the X that does this is: 
Environments, Mechanisms, and Games
PublicX = ( i A i ) − N c 2 i B i
Groves-Ledyard Mechanisms
The tax to be paid by i is:
where γ is an arbitrary free parameter greater than 0,
is the mean value of the messages of the other agents, and σ
is the squared deviation from this
. Different values of γ imply different outcome functions and, therefore, different mechanisms. So by letting γ range over values in (0, ∞), one creates an entire class of mechanisms.
Games An environment and a mechanism combine to create a game, G = {N, H, u}, where N is the number of players, a strategy of i is h 
We let G(γ) be the game derived this way. As γ ranges over (0, ∞), a continuum of games is generated. The Nash equilibrium strategy for i in the game G(γ) isĥ i (γ) where :
Growing the economy In this paper we are concerned with what happens as we increase the size of the economy. To keep things comparable as N grows, we consider economies in which larger economies contain replicates of the smaller economies. Let E = (N, Z, V ) be an economy. The k-th replicate of E will have kN individuals. If V i is the utility of one person in E, there will be k people in the k-th replicate with that utility function. We let
The level of public good that maximizes the sum of utilities in E(k) iŝ
That is, the optimal level of public good does not change as we increase the size of the economy. The equilibrium strategy for i in the game generated by E(k) iŝ
We will see below that there will be a reason to normalize γ by the size of the economy. That is, we will want to let γ = kγ as the economy grows. In this case, the equilibrium strategy for i in the game generated by
so thatĥ
Prior Results
The theoretical equilibrium properties of Groves-Ledyard mechanisms are well understood. The tax and allocation rules are specifically designed so that, if the agents follow Nash equilibrium behavior, then the equilibrium outcome of a one-shot game will be a Pareto optimal allocation. Formally, from (2), ifm is a Nash equilibrium of G(γ) then im i =X. In environments with quasi-linear preferences, the Pareto optimal level of public good is unique and the equilibrium outcome level of the public good is independent of γ. But if one is interested in actually using these mechanisms, it is necessary to understand their dynamics. For example, if one is interested in the ability of the mechanisms to attain optimal levels of utility in repeated situations, then one must ask whether and how fast individuals will converge to the Nash equilibrium, since faster convergence implies higher aggregate welfare.
Theory is mostly silent on the dynamics of Groves-Ledyard mechanisms. Two exceptions are the papers by Chen and Tang (1998) and by Muench and Walker (1983) , both of which suggest that the parameter γ plays a major role in those dynamics for agents following adaptive strategies. Based on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) on strategic complementarities, Chen and Tang (1998) derive a sufficient condition for quadratic preferences, γ/N ≥ 2B i for all i, for the convergence of the mechanism in a sequence of repeated one-shot games if agents use adaptive learning.
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Another sufficient condition for global convergence to Nash equilibrium, if agents use best response, can be derived from a theorem of Gabay and Moulin (1980) using a dominant diagonal condition. 5 
For quadratic preferences that condition holds if
for all i. However, neither the strategic complementarity nor the dominant diagonal condition provide any insight into how the speed of convergence might depend on γ. Such knowledge is particularly important for practical implementations. Muench and Walker (1983) examined the dynamics of GL mechanisms in large economies under best response behavior. They found that if γ were fixed as N grew, then there was ak such that for k >k the dynamics were unstable. 6 They showed that this instability could be avoided if γ were allowed to grow with the economy. Let γ(k) = kNγ. Then best response dynamics are stable for our environments as can be seen in the sufficient condition of Gabay- 
, for all k > 0. But they then pointed out that this would cause the utility of each agent to flatten out in the sense that the utility they get from the equilibrium best response is not much different than the utility they get from using the strategy
So if there are any cognitive costs, the agents will have little incentive to move to the optimal equilibrium.
In Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a), our goal was to identify a behavioral learning model that was consistent with the behavior observed in the economic experiments with human subjects. We used two sets of experimental results from the Groves-Ledyard environments, the set reported by Chen and Tang (1998) , and the set that we generated in July 2007. In our experiments, we followed Chen and Tangs experimental design, including the number of players. Thus, in the simulations and the analysis of our behavioral model, we only considered groups of size N = 5. In that context, IEL exhibited behavior consistent with humans but at odds with the theoretical predictions. In particular there were three main findings from our simulations with IEL and 5 agents: (1) There is convergence to Nash equilibrium messages of the stage game for all of the values of γ that we simulated, including γ = 1. Convergence is fast for a much larger set of the values of γ than that predicted by either the strategic complementarity condition or the dominant diagonal condition, (2) the time to first convergence, is smooth and U-shaped in γ with the minimum average convergence time occurring at around γ = 50 and (3) convergence is stable in the sense that once the model first nears the equilibrium, it remains in its neighborhood.
This of course leaves open the question as to whether these findings with IEL would 3 Adaptive learning is defined in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and includes best response, fictitious play, Bayesian Learning and others. 4 The sufficient condition for convergence under adaptive learning is 6 This follows from the Gabay-Moulin condition since the left hand side of the inequality goes to zero as N → 0, while the right hand side is bounded away from zero.
7 It can be shown that lim
survive scaling up to larger groups. We turn to that now.
Description of the Learning Algorithm
Our algorithm, Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) is based on the evolutionary paradigm that successful strategies thrive and increase in frequency over time and that there is occasional experimentation. This paradigm has been usually associated with models of social learning, where agents learn by imitating and adopting strategies of more successful agents. 8 However, in IEL the evolution of strategies takes place at the level of the individual agent who has a collection of remembered strategies that is updated over time. 
Individual Evolutionary Learning
An environment and a mechanism combine to form a game which can be turned into a repeated game. The repeated game has a stage game G and a number of rounds, T . The idea is that G will be played for T rounds. 10 Since we use the identical algorithm that we used for our simulations with N = 5, our description closely follows the behavioral model presented in Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a) .
11 J is a free parameter of IEL. In this paper we set J = 200. 12 ρ is a free parameter of the behavioral model. In this paper we set ρ = 0.033, exactly the same number we have used in our other IEL papers.
is set equal to the value of the alternative, θ i j,t that is to be replaced by a new alternative. The standard deviation is set to 1.
Secondly, imitation takes place. It increases the frequencies of the alternatives that would have been good choices in previous rounds. It allows potentially better paying strategies to replace those that might pay less. How do we define the measure of "potentially better paying strategies". We let u 
. Imitation for t + 1 favors alternatives with a lot of copies at t and alternatives that would have paid well at t, had they been used. So it is a process with a form of averaging over past periods. If the actual contributions of others have provided a favorable situation for an alternative θ i j,t on average then that alternative will tend to accumulate replicates in Θ i t , (it is fondly remembered), and thus will be more likely to be actually used. Over time, the sets Θ i t become more homogeneous as most alternatives become copies of the best performing alternative.
Third, selection occurs. Each contribution has the following probability of being selected: The only feature remaining to be specified is the initialization process -how (Θ i 0 , π i 0 ) is determined. We implement two different approaches, random and modified initialization. 13 An alternative selection model is the probabilistic choice function π(θ
We have found (see e.g. Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a) that the behavior predicted changes very little with this model from our proportional selection rule, for all λ. This is because the set A tends to become homogeneous fairly fast, at which point the selection rule is irrelevant.
14 This implies that if there are negative foregone utilities in a set, payoffs are normalized by adding a constant to each payoff that is, in absolute value, equal to the lowest payoff in the set.
With random initialization, for each i, we generate a set, Θ i 0 , of J messages using a uniform distribution on H i . After that, we start the first period of the game. At t = 1, one of the alternatives that becomes an actual message is chosen randomly from the uniform distribution in {1, . . . , J}.
We created modified initialization to try to capture the phenomenon that an agent, who thinks hard about the problem before beginning of the play, might be able to eliminate a lot of guessing and focus on productive strategies out of the box. We took an approach to this that is often referred to as level 1 of a cognitive hierarchy 15 where the individual assumes all others are behaving randomly while that individual optimizes against that randomness. In the modified initialization, the first stage is the same as with random initialization, i.e. for each i, J messages are chosen from the uniform distribution over H As reported in Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a) , with N = 5, IEL with modified initialization is somewhat faster in terms of convergence times. IEL with random initialization matched the data from Chan and Tang's experiments better, while the modified initialization matched the data from our own experiments better. 16 
Procedures and Results

The basics
The environment In Arifovic and Ledyard (2008) we used the utility functions and cost of production in Chen and Tang (1998) in order to compare our results to those generated with humans. The per person cost, c, of producing a unit of the public good, which determines Z, is set to 20 and the utility parameters are given in table 1. We consider a basic environment E with N = 5. We also consider E (10) with N = 50 and E (20) with N = 100.
The behavioral model We used the IEL model described in the previous section. The mechanisms Our goal is to investigate the pattern of convergence times over a range of values of γ that includes the cut points associated with the dominant-diagonal and strategic complementarity conditions. For our model with N = 5, the dominant-diagonal condition is satisfied for γ ≥ 30, and the strategic complementarity condition is satisfied for γ ≥ 80. Thus, for N = 5, we picked γ = 10, 30, 50, 80, 100, 180, and 260.
The sufficient condition generated by a strategic complements sufficiency condition for convergence of best reply algorithms requires that γ be scaled linearly in N . This is also true for the dominant diagonal condition for convergence of best reply algorithms. Thus, for N = 50 (k = 10) and N = 100 (k = 20) we chose values of γ so that the ratio γ/k remained constant.
The simulations For each mechanism, γ, we conducted R = 1, 000 runs. Each run, r, was terminated 100 periods after a convergence criterion was fulfilled.
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For the analysis of the behavior observed in the simulations reported in this paper, we adopt the same convergence criteria that we used in Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a) . This allows us to compare the results of simulations with 'small' and 'large' N .
Our convergence criteria is defined in terms of how close all agents' messages are to the equilibrium messages. This convergence criterion is fulfilled when the difference between the equilibrium value and the value of the selected message of each agent is less than or equal, in absolute terms, to a positive number d; i.e., when |m 
Performance measures
Because we are interested in whether and how fast these mechanisms converge to the equilibrium, we use two measures of performance: (1) 
We denote the standard deviation from this value, across the R runs, by σ T γ .
Stability of convergence In addition to recording the time when our convergence criterion is first fulfilled, we also want to find out how stable it is (as in Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a) ). In other words, is the convergence criterion satisfied by accident and agents have heterogenous collections of messages, or do the collections converge towards the values of the equilibrium messages. The measure that we use (see Arifovic and Ledyard, 2008a ) is based on the individual's action sets -the set of strategies from which the agents choose their messages. We call this the index of equilibrium stability in strategies S s . It measures the percentage of all possible choices that are close to that agent's equilibrium message. 
Results
Convergence Times Tables 2-7 and figure 1 show that increases in the number of agents does not affect the dynamics of IEL in GL games. The U-shaped feature of convergence time is preserved across ten and twenty times increases in the number of agents. The factor γ/N = 50 remains the value that results in the minimum time to convergence.
Overall, the times of convergence slightly increase with 10 and 20 fold increases in the number of agents. With random initialization, for each γ/k value,T It is perhaps understandable that for low values of γ/k, especially below 30, the time to converge will be higher than for values between 30 and 80 since best reply dynamics are unstable (due primarily to overreactions) and so a period of averaging is necessary to get convergence. But this does not explain the fact thatT γ c increases for high values of γ/k. As γ/k grows, there is stronger pressure for all agents to coordinate on a common value, typically not the equilibrium one, in order to minimize the difference between their own and average contribution of others. Once the coordination takes place, strategies that participated in this receive relatively high payoffs and are then copied, increasing in frequency. So, collections of strategies become homogenized. At that point, experimentation is required in order to introduce strategies close to the equilibrium ones that will get the mechanism out of the non-equilibrium outcome. However, given the circumstances, it takes time for the required experimentation to succeed. Most new values that deviate from the one everyone has coordinated on will most likely receive lower foregone payoffs and thus, disappear from the collections. The larger that γ/k is the more important this effect becomes, increasing the time to converge to equilibrium.
The values of the standard deviation of the time to converge, σ T γ , follow the same Ushaped pattern as the times to convergence do. Standard deviations decrease with γ/k until γ/k = 50 (which is also the value of minimumT γ c ) and then start increasing, reaching high values for the two largest γ/k values, 180 and 260. This pattern is shared by both random and modified initialization. The standard deviations are smaller for the modified initialization than for the random initialization. The explanation for this is that all the simulations with modified initialization start out with collections of strategies that are more similar across different runs, and thus, are likely to have more similar dynamics, and a tighter distribution of convergence times. The standard deviations decrease as N increases, a variation on the law of large numbers.
Stability Once the IEL reaches an equilibrium, there is a high degree of stability. For all of the simulations, our measure of stability is above 96%. Again, one can notice, for N = 5 and N = 50, a slightly U-shaped pattern, with stability increasing as γ/k reaches 50, and slightly decreasing after that. Simulations with N = 100, have stability values close to 100% for all values of γ/k and for both types of initialization.
The impact of the modified initialization Based on our work with N = 5, we expected the modified initialization to lead to faster times of convergence. But, instead, for N = 50 and N = 100 the convergence times are pretty much the same for random and modified initializations. There is an explanation for this.
As described in the previous section, we start the modified initialization by randomly drawing J rules for each agent i. Then for each rule j, we randomly draw 100 values of µ −jk in [−4, 6] and 100 values of σ , for that rule. Then using these average utilities, we do imitation. For the games generated by GL mechanisms in quadratic environments, the parts of our hypothetical utility functions, that are involved in comparing any two rules for imitation, are linear in µ −i and do not include σ 2 −i . Thus, the distribution of σ 2 −i does not matter at all and only the expected value of µ −i plays a role. So (with some randomness) our initialization essentially computes the best response to µ −i = 1. So the closer that the expected value of µ −i is to its equilibrium value the faster convergence will be.
The precise calculation of the equilibrium value of µ −i is: This intuition also helps explain why the variance of convergence times is lower for modified than for random. Modified starts out at about the same place each time whereas random starts from many different places. On average they take the same time (since, on average, random also starts at µ −i = 1) but sometimes random is closer and sometimes it is not.
The impact of an increase in the rate of experimentation We conducted a set of simulations for with random initialization and a rate of experimentation ρ = 0.066. The higher rate of experimentation, twice as high as in our baseline simulations, resulted in somewhat faster convergence times. On average, for each γ/k, convergence is by 3 -4 periods faster compared to the simulations with ρ = 0.033. We illustrate the results, for N = 5 and random initialization in Table 7 . It is interesting to note that relatively high rate of experimentation does not introduce disruption that might slow down or prevent convergence. Instead it speeds things up. The reason for this is the fact that new values generated via experimentation are not played out right away. They first have to prove, in terms of foregone payoffs, that they might be worthwhile candidates. If they do so, then, through imitation, they increase in frequency and thus increase their chances to be selected as actual messages. Otherwise, new values with relatively low foregone payoffs quickly disappear from the collections.
Final Remarks
In Arifovic and Ledyard (2008a), we investigated IEL's behavior in a class of games with a small number of agents. The number of agents in that setup was equal to 5 in order to match the design and the number of human subjects who participated in the laboratory experiments. Both IEL simulations and experiments were conducted for a number of different values of the free parameter of the model. Our results showed that IEL successfully captures and predicts the behavior observed in the experiments with human subjects. We have also successfully applied our behavioral model in the context of the call markets where the IEL model generates the same types of price volatility and efficiencies as those generated in our experiments with human subjects (Arifovic and Ledyard, 2008a) , and to the voluntary provision of public goods environment where our model matches the patterns of behavior of the average contribution over time from a number of different human subjects experiments (Arifovic and Ledyard, 2008b ). This collection of results suggests that we can use our behavioral model as a computer testbed to study a number of mechanism design issues such as out-of-equilibrium behavior, speed of convergence, efficiency, price volatility, and the stability of equilibria.
Thus, in this paper, we used this methodology to investigate what happens with GrovesLedyard mechanisms in linear public good environments when the number of agents, N becomes large. Testbeds of this scale are not easily implemented in the controlled laboratory setting with human subjects. Our findings are interesting. The main features of the behavior observed with the small number of agents are preserved when γ is scaled by the multiplicative factor k. For a given γ/k, the average times to convergence are similar. Further, the Ushaped pattern arising from variations in the value of γ/k is preserved. 
